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Export cartel and consumer welfare 
 
1. Introduction 
During 1990s, both the USA and the European Union successfully prosecuted more 
than forty international export cartels (Levenstein et al., 2004). International export 
cartel is a serious concern for many developing countries. Many countries provide 
exemptions to export cartels either explicitly or implicitly.1 The prosecutions of such 
export cartels are rather limited due to the lack of international coordination between 
antitrust agencies. In this context, various scholars have expressed concerns about the 
impact of such international cartels on the importing countries. 
More generally, cooperation among the competing firms raises serious 
scepticism among economists, policy makers and legal experts. For instance, it is 
believed that, in the absence of significant synergic benefits, the firms’ gains from 
cooperation come at the expense of the consumers (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990), and 
create concerns for the antitrust authorities. However, this view generally ignores 
non-production activities of the firms such as innovation (Jacquemin and Slade, 
1989). The Schumpeterian view suggests that cooperation among the competing firms 
may benefit the consumers by creating positive effects on innovation (Schumpeter, 
1943). However, there are also concerns about the adverse effects of firms’ 
cooperation on innovation (Arrow, 1962). More recent concern about the adverse 
effects of firms’ cooperation on innovation can be found in Gilbert and Sunshine 
(1995), Gilbert and Tom (2001) and Gilbert (2006a).2 
                                                 
1
 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005 and 2007). 
2
 The DOJ/FTC annual reports to Congress show that between 1990 and 1994, the agencies allege 
adverse innovation effects in about 3% of the merger challenges, while from 1995 to 1999, the concern 
about the adverse innovation effects has risen to 18% of the merger challenges, and between 2000 to 
2003, the concern has increased to 38% of the merger challenges (Gilbert, 2006b). 
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 While there is controversy about the beneficial effects of product-market 
cooperation on innovation, recent works show that there exist other channels through 
which product-market cooperation create positive effects on the consumers. 
Symeonidis (2008) and Mukherjee (2010) show that product-market cooperation may 
benefit the consumers in the presence of input market imperfection. While the focus 
of Symeonidis (2008) was on firm-specific input suppliers, Mukherjee (2010) 
considered the situation where all firms need to buy some critical inputs, such as 
labour, from an industry-wide input supplier. 
In this paper, we show a new beneficial effect of product-market cooperation 
on the consumers. We show that even if the firms are not engaged in innovation and 
there is no input market imperfection, product-market cooperation among the firms 
may make the consumers better off in the presence of strategic trade policies. Hence, 
we show that export cartel may create positive effects on the consumers in the 
importing country. 
Using the strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985a) with 
two exporting countries and an importing country, we examine whether cooperation 
among the exporters is necessarily bad for the consumers in the importing country. 
We show that consumers in the importing country may be better off under higher 
product-market cooperation among the foreign exporters in the presence of strategic 
trade policies of the exporting countries. On the one hand, higher product-market 
cooperation tends to reduce consumer surplus by increasing product-market 
concentration. On the other hand, higher product-market cooperation tends to increase 
consumer surplus by increasing export subsidies. We show that the latter effect can 
dominate the former effect to create a favourable impact on the consumers following 
higher product-market cooperation. Hence, cooperation among the exporters or 
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international export cartel is not necessarily bad for the importing countries in the 
presence of strategic trade policies. 
We also investigate the effect of cooperation among the governments of the 
exporting countries on the consumers. We show that the consumers in the importing 
country can be worse off if the cooperation is between the governments of the 
exporting countries. Hence, the favourable effect of higher product-market 
cooperation on the consumers reduces with higher cooperation among the 
governments of the exporting countries. We show that our results hold under different 
types of product-market competition, viz., quantity and price competition. 
Increased cooperation among the exporting countries makes the consumers in 
the importing country worse off since it reduces each country’s incentive for stealing 
business from the firm of the other country, and increases the incentive for restricting 
outputs towards the collusive level. This motivation induces the countries to increase 
the export tax as the degree of cooperation among the countries increases, which, in 
turn, restricts the total outputs of the firms and makes the consumers in the importing 
country worse off. 
Our paper can be related to some other recent papers looking at the 
implications of export cartels. In a different context with cross hauling trade, Deltas et 
al. (2012) also established the consumer welfare enhancing collusion but for entirely 
different reason. The advantage of collusion in their analysis stems from the “home 
market principle”, which gives the cartel members preference for supplying their 
home markets.3 Bhattacharjea (2004) and Levenstein et al. (2004) respectively 
discussed the significance of international export cartel for the developing countries 
                                                 
3
 See also Motta (2004) and Harrington (2006) for the “home market principle”. 
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and for the export cartel among the firms from the same country. However, neither of 
these papers addressed the questions raised in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results under quantity competition. Section 3 extends the 
analysis in several directions including price competition. Section 4 concludes. We 
show our results with a general demand function in the Appendix. 
  
2. Quantity competition 
We consider a model similar to Brander and Spencer (1985a). Assume that there are 
two foreign countries, country 1 and country 2. Each country has one firm. Call the 
firms in countries 1 and 2 as firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Assume that the firms sell 
their products in another country, called domestic country. The inverse market 
demand function in the domestic country is P = 1 – q. We will show in the Appendix 
that our results will hold for a general demand function. We normalise the marginal 
costs of production of both firms to zero, for simplicity. Assume that the foreign 
countries are engaged in strategic trade policies and provide subsidies (taxes, if the 
variable is negative) to their own firms. 
 We consider the following game. At stage 1, countries 1 and 2 simultaneously 
determine the per-unit export subsidies/taxes given to respective firms. At stage 2, 
both firms choose their outputs simultaneously, and the profits are realised. We solve 
the game through backward induction.4 
                                                 
4
 A natural reaction in the context of export subsidy used by foreign governments is some 
countervailing duty or import tariff used by the importing country. In the presence of import tariff, it is 
easy to see that the welfare of the importing country would improve further which would reinforce our 
results derived in this paper. To clearly focus on the interaction of strategic trade policy and welfare of 
the importing country, we keep the import tariff out of our analysis (i.e., kept at zero). For some 
analysis of import tariff in the context of export subsidy used by exporting countries, see, Collie (1994) 
and Qiu (1995). 
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 Given the export subsidies 1s  and 2s  provided by countries 1 and 2 to firms 1 
and 2 respectively, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions respectively to 
determine their outputs 
 
1
1 1 2 2(1 ) (1 )qMax q s q q s qα− + + − +                  (1) 
 
2
2 2 1 1(1 ) (1 )qMax q s q q s qα− + + − + .                 (2) 
The term [0,1]α ∈  is the “coefficient of cooperation”, as introduced by Cyert and 
deGroot (1973), and later used by others such as Symeonidis (2000 and 2008), 
Mukherjee (2010) and Escrihuela-Villar (2012). It captures firm’s behaviour towards 
cooperation in the product market. If 0α = , the maximisation problem reduces to the 
standard non-cooperative Cournot maximisation problem, while 1α =  implies that 
the firms are interested in joint profit maximisation. The intermediate values of α  
show imperfect or partial cooperation among the firms. 
 Like Cyert and deGroot (1973), Symeonidis (2000 and 2008) and Mukherjee 
(2010), we believe that the use of α  is the easiest way to capture firm’s cooperative 
behaviour. It can be justified by referring to some implicit dynamic models of 
collusion, where the reduced-form representation of the dynamic game represents the 
product-market competition subgame of our paper. As mentioned in Symeonidis 
(2000 and 2008), what justifies the use of α  as a reduced-form competition parameter 
is its properties in the final-stage subgame; ceteris paribus, the equilibrium price, 
price-cost margin, and profit in the final goods market increases and the equilibrium 
outputs fall as α  increases (i.e., cooperation increases or competition falls). 
It is well-known from the “folk theorem” that if the discount factors are very 
high (i.e., the economic agents are sufficiently patient), any combination of outcomes 
can be sustained as the collusive outcome, thus creating the problems of multiplicity 
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of equilibria. However, attention has been paid to find the unique collusive outcome. 
For example, in the case of symmetric oligopoly models, symmetric and Pareto 
optimal equilibrium is often considered as the ‘focal point’ (Kreps, 1990 and Chang, 
1991). Hence, if the discount factor in the implicit dynamic models of collusion is 
very high, 1α =  is a reasonable parameter for our analysis. And a fall in α  from 1 
corresponds to the case of a lower discount factor, creating partial cooperation (see, 
e.g., Chang, 1991 and Escrihuela-Villar, 2008 and 2012, for partial collusion). 
There are more satisfactory theories to resolve the problem of multiplicity of 
equilibria. A way to find the critical discount factor is the “balanced temptation” 
criterion suggested by Friedman (1971). According to this criterion, the cartel adjusts 
the output quotas of the firms so that all firms have the same incentive to defect from 
the cartel. Bae (1987), which assumed that the prices are determined to maximise 
joint profits, considered the “balanced temptation” equilibrium with the Pareto 
optimality condition restricted to the set of sustainable cartels for asymmetric 
duopoly, and found the “best sustainable equilibrium”. Harrington (1991) finds the 
unique collusive outcome by considering Nash bargaining solution from the set of 
sustainable equilibria which helps to overcome the weaknesses in the selection 
criterion of Bae (1987). Using a duopoly with heterogeneous firms, Verboven (1997) 
shows that the equilibrium at which both firms are just indifferent between colluding 
and defecting is the enforceable collusive agreement that is likely to prevail. For some 
other papers considering dynamic models of collusion, one may refer to Collie (1993), 
Rothschild (1999), Collie (2004) and Escrihuela-Villar (2012) for collusion among 
asymmetric cost firms, and Chang (1991), Escrihuela-Villar (2008 and 2012) for 
partial collusion. Appealing to this literature, we consider that the parameter α  is the 
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reduced-form representation of an implicit dynamic collusive game following 
government policies that generates a unique collusive outcome among the firms. 
The parameter α  may have an alternative interpretation. It can capture the 
situations with different “conjectural variations”, incorporating a wide range of 
competition. Brander and Spencer (1985b), which use a conjectural variation model to 
show the relationship between free entry and partial collusion in a convenient 
structure, mention that “the value of the conjectural variation, which is associated 
with a particular price and industry output given the number of firms, is interpreted as 
a proxy for or a representation of the level of tacit (or explicit) collusion in the 
industry. Alternatively, even with tacit collusion, the conjectural variation, λ  [their 
notation], may be the literal expectation held by firms. If λ  exceeds 1, each firm 
expects to be punished if it raises output, in the sense that the rest of the industry will 
also raise output. Tacit partial collusion can be maintained if such expectations are 
held.” In our analysis, the parameter α  captures the collusive behaviour among the 
firms that had been captured by the conjectural variation parameter, λ , in Brander 
and Spencer (1985b). Hwang (1984) and Chang and Sugeta (2004) analyse 
respectively the welfare effects of intra-industry trade and the optimal trade policy in 
a vertical structure in a unified model of different competition captured by conjectural 
variations. 
Although the use of the conjectural variation parameter to reflect collusion is 
useful, we acknowledge that it is a simple static representation of a complex dynamic 
analysis. However, Kalai and Stanford (1983) show that a family of constant 
conjectural variations can be maintained as stable and credible equilibria of an 
infinitely repeated game. Friedman and Mezzetti (2002) consider a dynamic model 
with bounded rationality to provide a logically consistent interpretation of conjectural 
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variation. In a symmetric quantity-setting oligopoly, Escrihuela-Villar (2015) shows 
that the solutions generated from conjectural variations model and from a model with 
“coefficient of cooperation” are equivalent. 
Since the purpose of our paper is to show the effects of cooperation, we 
consider α  as an exogenous parameter, although we show the implications of 
endogenous cooperation in subsection 3.1. The exogeneity of α may be justified if 
significant changes in the intensity of competition is the outcome of exogenous 
institutional changes such as the introduction of effective cartel policy (Symeonidis, 
2000 and 2008). 
We assume that there are no side payments between the firms, and each firm 
chooses the product-market variable (i.e., output or price depending on the quantity or 
price competition respectively) to maximise the objective functions (1) and (2).5 
When the costs are asymmetric due to different levels of subsidies, in the absence of 
side payments, only some range of cooperation parameter α  is sustainable. The more 
symmetric are the subsidies, the larger is the range of α  that is sustainable. The case 
of 1α =  is sustainable under the symmetric case. Since the firms and the governments 
are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium for 1α = . 
 The equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 can be found respectively as 
 
* 1 2
1
1 2 (1 )
(1 )(3 )
s sq α α
α α
− + − +
=
− +
 and * 2 12
1 2 (1 )
(1 )(3 )
s sq α α
α α
− + − +
=
− +
.             (3) 
We assume that the subsidies/taxes are such that the outputs shown in (3) are positive 
for 1α < . We will see that this is true with the equilibrium subsidies/taxes. Since the 
firms and the governments are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium for 
                                                 
5
 See, e,g., Bain (1948) and Harrington (1991) for objections towards side payments. 
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1α = , implying that, in the absence of side payments, the equilibrium outputs with 
symmetric subsidies/taxes (i.e., * * *1 2s s s= = ) will be 
*
* * *
1 2
1
4
sq q q += = =  for 1α = . 
The total output is 
 
* 1 22
(3 )
s sq
α
+ +
=
+
.                   (4) 
The price of the product is 1 2(1 )(3 )
s sp α
α
+ − −
=
+
. 
 It is immediate from (4) that, for given 1s  and 2s , the total output will reduce 
with higher α . However, if the countries choose their trade policies strategically, α  
will affect 1s  and 2s , and, as we will see, it will have significant impact on the 
outputs. 
The profits of firms 1 and 2 are respectively   
1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2
(1 2 )(1 2 (1 ))( ) (1 )(3 )
s s s s sp s q α α α αpi
α α
+ + + − − + − +
= + =
− +
             (5) 
2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2
(1 2 )(1 2 (1 ))( ) (1 )(3 )
s s s s sp s q α α α αpi
α α
+ + + − − + − +
= + =
− +
.              (6) 
Note that welfare of an exporting country is given by “the profit of that 
country’s firm minus the subsidy amount”. Hence, welfare of countries 1 and 2 can be 
obtained, respectively, as 
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2
(1 )(1 2 (1 ))
(1 )(3 )
s s s sW s q pq α α αpi
α α
+ − − − + − +
≡ − = =
− +
 
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 )(1 2 (1 ))
(1 )(3 )
s s s sW s q pq α α αpi
α α
+ − − − + − +
≡ − = =
− +
. 
The exporting countries may also cooperate and the ith exporting country, 
1, 2i = , determines subsidy to maximise its own welfare plus welfare of the jth 
country, 1, 2j =  and i j≠ , weighted by [0,1]δ ∈ , i.e., determining is  to maximise 
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i jW Wδ+ . If δ  = 1, it represents full cooperation among the governments, while δ  = 
0 means that countries maximize their own welfare non-cooperatively. If (0,1)δ ∈ , it 
represents imperfect cooperation among the governments. Lie firms, the easy way to 
show the implications of cooperation among the countries is to compare 0δ =  to 
1δ = . Like the parameter α , the intermediate values of (0,1)δ ∈  can be justified by 
appealing to an implicit dynamic game of collusion or conjectural variations among 
the governments. Like α , we consider δ  as an exogenous parameter, although we 
show the implications of endogenous δ  in subsection 3.1. The exogeneity of δ  can 
be justified due to exogenous institutional changes such as economic integration. Like 
the firms, we do not consider side payments among the governments. 
Country 1 determines its subsidy to maximise 1 2W Wδ+ , or 
1
1 2 1 2 2 1
2
[1 ][(1 2 (1 )) (1 2 (1 ))]
(1 )(3 )s
s s s s s sMax α α α δ α α
α α
+ − − − + − + + − + − +
− +
.       (7) 
Similarly country 2 determines its subsidy to maximise 2 1W Wδ+ , or 
2
2 1 2 1 1 2
2
[1 ][(1 2 (1 )) (1 2 (1 ))]
(1 )(3 )s
s s s s s sMax α α α δ α α
α α
+ − − − + − + + − + − +
− +
.    (8) 
The equilibrium export subsidies can be found as 
 
2
* *
1 2
1 3 (2 )
5 (1 3 )s s
α δ α α
α δ α
− − + + +
= =
− + + +
.               (10) 
We get that * *1 2
1 3
5
s s
α
α
+
= =
−
 for 0δ =  and * *1 2
1
4
s s
α− +
= =
 for 1δ = . Further, 
* *
1 2
1 2
5
s s
δ
δ
− +
= =
− +
 for α  = 0 and * *1 2 1s s= =  for α  = 1. We also get that 
2
* *
1 2
(1 )
5 3
s s
α
α
+
= =
+
 for δ α= .   
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There are some interesting observations which are in order. First, if α  = 0, 
i.e., under non-cooperation among the firms, the countries set subsidies for 1
2
δ <  and 
the subsidy falls with respect to δ . However, the countries impose tax for  1
2
δ >  and 
the tax increases with δ . The reason for this is as follows. As discussed in Brander 
and Spencer (1985a), the “business stealing motive” is the rationale for providing 
export subsidies. However, this motive disappears for higher degree of cooperation 
among the exporting countries; instead the collusive behaviour becomes more 
important for higher degree of cooperation among the exporting countries. Hence, the 
exporting countries impose export tax to create more collusive product-market 
outcome if the degree of cooperation among the exporting countries is high. 
Second, if δ  = 0, i.e., under no cooperation among the governments of the 
exporting countries, the subsidy level goes up with α . This happens since higher 
cooperation among the exporting firms increases the marginal benefit from export 
subsidies. Hence, the export subsidies increase with higher degree of cooperation 
among the exporting firms. 
Using the equilibrium subsidies, we get the total output as 
2( 2 )
* ( 5 3 )q
δ αδ
α δ αδ
− + +
=
− + + +
.               (11) 
Since consumer surplus in the importing country is given by 
2
*
2
q
, it is enough 
for us to see the effects of product-market cooperation on the total exports to 
determine  the effect of cooperation on the consumers in the importing country. 
If δ  = 0, we get from (11) that * 4(5 )q α= − , suggesting that if α  increases, 
the total output sold in the importing country increases, thus making the consumers in 
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the importing country better off. Higher α  creates two effects. On the one hand, as 
shown in (4), given the subsidies, higher product-market cooperation reduces total 
output. On the other hand, it follows from (10) that if δ  = 0, higher product-market 
cooperation increases subsidies. It follows from (11) that the latter effect dominates 
the former effect, and higher product-market cooperation increases total output and 
makes the consumers in the importing country better off. 
It is interesting to note that the effect of cooperation among the governments 
of the exporting countries may have an opposite effect on the consumers compared to 
the situation where cooperation is among the firms. It follows from (11) that if α  = 0, 
we get ( 4 2 )* ( 5 )q
δ
δ
− +
=
− +
. In this situation, higher cooperation among the governments 
of the exporting countries reduces subsidies and the total output, thus making the 
consumers in the importing country worse off. 
 We summarise the above discussion in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: (a) If the exporting countries do not cooperate to set the trade 
policies, higher cooperation among the exporting firms (i.e., higher α ) increases 
export subsidies and total exports, leading to higher consumer surplus in the 
importing country. 
(b) If the exporting firms do not cooperate, as the degree of cooperation among the 
government of the exporting countries increases (i.e., δ  increases), it decreases 
export subsidies and total exports, leading to a fall in consumer surplus in the 
importing country.   
 
 As indicated in the introduction, the reason for Proposition 1(a) is as follows. 
Increased product-market cooperation tends to reduce consumer surplus by increasing 
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product-market concentration, but it also tends to increase consumer surplus by 
increasing export subsidies. We show that the latter effect can dominate the former 
effect to create a favourable impact on the consumers in the importing country. 
As indicated in the introduction, the reason for Proposition 1(b) is as follows. 
As the degree of cooperation among the exporting countries increases, the incentive 
for “business stealing” reduces and the incentive for restricting outputs towards the 
collusive level increases. This motivation induces the countries to increase the export 
tax as the degree of cooperation among the countries increases. However, higher tax 
rates following higher cooperation among the governments of the exporting countries 
restrict the total outputs of the firms and make the consumers in the importing country 
worse off. 
The above analysis shows that cooperation among the exporting firms and 
cooperation among the exporting governments have significantly different impacts on 
the consumers (and therefore, on welfare) of the importing country. It is immediate 
that if both the governments as well as firms cooperate, the effects on consumers will 
depend on the degrees of cooperation among the government and the firms. As a 
special case, one can easily see the implications of α = δ from our analysis. To avoid 
repetition, we do not go into the details of this case. 
We have considered a linear demand function for the above analysis. 
However, we show in the Appendix that our results hold for a general demand 
function. 
 
3. Extensions 
In this section, we extend the above analysis in different directions. 
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3.1. Endogenous cooperation 
We have considered in the above analysis that cooperation among the firms and that 
of among the governments are exogenously given. If we allow the firms and the 
governments to determine the degree of cooperation that maximise the profits of the 
firms and welfare of the exporting countries, we can find by maximising each profit 
and by maximising each welfare with respect to the corresponding cooperation 
parameters that each firm as well as each government will prefer full cooperation. In 
this situation, there will be zero subsidy/tax and the total output will be 1
2
. Hence, 
cooperation among the governments will make the consumers of the importing 
country worse off compared to non-cooperation among the governments, irrespective 
of non-cooperation and cooperation among the firms.6 
 
3.2. Positive production costs 
We have considered zero production costs in Section 2 for simplicity. We show here 
that our results hold even if there are positive production costs. Assume that the 
marginal costs of both firms are c, with 0 < c < 1 so that the outputs of both firms are 
positive. Straightforward calculations will show that the equilibrium subsidies are 
( ) ( )( )
* *
1
2
*
2
1 1 3 2
5 3
s s s
c α α α δ
α δ αδ
− + − − + + +
−
− + + +
= = =  and the equilibrium total output is 
( ) ( )* 2 1 2
5 3
c
q
δ αδ
α δ αδ
− + − + +
−
− + + +
= . We get that ( )( )
*
2
4 1
0( 0)
5
q cδ
α α
∂ =
=
−
>
−
∂
 and 
( )
( )
*
2
( 0) 6 1 0
5
cq α
δ δ
− −∂
−
=
∂
<
=
, which provides results like Proposition 1. 
                                                 
6
 If there is no cooperation among the government (i.e., 0δ = ), the firms prefer full cooperation (i.e., 
1α = ). 
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3.3. Asymmetric costs 
We have derived Proposition 1 under the assumption that the firms have symmetric 
costs, which are assumed to be zero for simplicity. We will show in this section that 
Proposition 1 holds even if the firms differ in costs. Assume that the marginal cost of 
firm 1 is 0 while the marginal cost of firm 2 is c, with 10
6
c< <  so that the outputs of 
both firms are positive. Straightforward calculation will show that the equilibrium 
subsidies/taxes are 
  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
*
1
221 1 3 2 2 1 3 1
1 5 3
s
cδ α α α δ α α δ α δ
δ α δ αδ
− + − − + + + + − + + − +
− + − +
=
+ +
, 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2
*
2
3 1 1 1 1 3 2
1 5 3
s
c α δ αδ δ α α α δ
δ α δ αδ
+ + − + + − + − − + +
− + − + + +
=
+
. 
The equilibrium total outputs are ( )( )* *1* 2 2 22
3 (5 3 )
cc s sq
δ αδ
α α δ αδ
− − −
− + +
=
+ − − −
= . We get 
that ( )( )
*
2
2 2
0( 0)
5
q cδ
α α
∂ =
=
−
>
−
∂
 and ( )( )
*
2
( 0) 3 2 0
5
cq α
δ δ
− −∂
−
=
∂
<
=
, which provides 
results like Proposition 1. 
 
3.4. Producers in the importing country 
We have derived Proposition 1 in a model like Brander and Spencer (1985a) where 
the importing country has no producers. We will show the implications of producers 
in the importing country in this subsection. To do this, we consider cooperation 
among the exporting firms only. However, there is no cooperation between the 
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exporting and import competing firms. We also assume that the firms are symmetric 
in cost. 
 Straightforward calculation will show that the equilibrium subsidies/taxes are 
( )* *
1 2
1 2
4 3
s s
δ α δ αδ
α αδ
− + + − + +
− + +
= =  and the equilibrium total outputs are 
( )
1*
* *
23 7 5
4 2 2 4 3
s sq α α δ αδ
α α αδ
+ + + − − −
=
+ − −
= . We get that ( )
*
2
3 0
2
( 0)
4
q δ
α α
∂
=
−
∂
>
=
 and 
*( 0 0) 1
8
q α
δ
∂ =
=
∂
− < , which provides results like Proposition 1. 
 It is easy to understand that if the markets are segmented and the exporting 
countries impose trade policies, our results will not be affected even if there are 
consumers in the exporting countries. This happens because, due to segmented 
markets and constant marginal costs, the amount of exports and the trade policies will 
not be affected by the sell in the exporting countries.  
 
3.5. Price competition 
We have assumed in the previous section that the firms compete in quantities. The 
purpose of this section is to show that the results shown in Proposition 1 hold even 
under price competition. Hence, our results are robust with respect to the type of 
product-market competition. 
 Like Section 2, we assume that the foreign firms 1 and 2 sell their products to 
the domestic country. However, we assume in this section that firms 1 and 2 compete 
in prices with horizontally differentiated products. The inverse market demand 
function for the ith firm is 
1i i jP q qγ= − − , 1, 2i =  and i j≠ .                (12) 
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The term [0,1]γ ∈  shows the degree of product differentiation with 0γ =  implying 
isolated products and 1γ =  implying perfect substitutes. We will concentrate on 
(0,1)γ ∈  to avoid the well-known Bertrand paradox that occurs for 1γ =  and to 
create product-market competition between the firms that occurs for 0γ > . We 
normalise the marginal costs of production of both firms to zero, for simplicity. 
Assume that both foreign countries are engaged in strategic trade policies and provide 
subsidies (taxes, if the variables are negative) to their own firms.  
 We consider a game similar to Section 2. At stage 1, countries 1 and 2 
simultaneously determine the per-unit export subsidies/taxes given to the respective 
firms. At stage 2, both firms choose their prices simultaneously, and the profits are 
realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 The inverse market demand function (12) gives the following demand function 
for the ith firm 
 2
1
1
i j
i
P P
q
γ γ
γ
− − +
=
−
, 1, 2i =  and i j≠ .              (13) 
Given the export subsidies 1s  and 2s  provided by countries 1 and 2 to firms 1 
and 2 respectively, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following expressions respectively to 
determine their prices 
 
1
1 2 2 1
1 1 2 22 2
1 1( ) ( )
1 1P
P P P PMax P s P sγ γ γ γα
γ γ
   − − + − − +
+ + +   
− −   
           (14) 
 
2
2 1 1 2
2 2 1 12 2
1 1( ) ( )
1 1P
P P P PMax P s P sγ γ γ γα
γ γ
   − − + − − +
+ + +   
− −   
,           (15) 
where, as before, [0,1]α ∈  shows the firms’ cooperative behaviour in the product 
market. 
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 The equilibrium prices of firms 1 and 2 can be found as 
2
* 1 2
1 2 2
( 1 )(2 ) ( 2 (1 ) ) ( )
4 (1 )
s sP γ γ αγ α α γ γ αγ
α γ
− + + + − − + + + −
=
− + +
 and 
2
* 2 1
2 2 2
( 1 )(2 ) ( 2 (1 ) ) ( )
4 (1 )
s sP γ γ αγ α α γ γ αγ
α γ
− + + + − − + + + −
=
− + +
 respectively. 
 Given the equilibrium prices *1P  and *2P , the problem of the ith country is to 
determine is  to maximise 
 
* * * * * * * * * *[( ) ] [( ) ]i j i i i i i j j j j j i i j jW W P s q s q P s q s q P q P qδ δ δ+ = + − + + − = + ,         (16) 
where 1, 2i =  and i j≠ , and as before, [0,1]δ ∈  shows the degree of cooperation 
among the governments of the exporting countries. 
The equilibrium export subsidies are 
2
* *
1 2 2 2
( 1 ) [ 2 ( 2 (1 ) ( ) ( 1 ( 1 ) ))]
( 1 )[4 ( 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 2 ))]s s
γ γ γ δ α α γ α δ γ α δ
αγ γ αδ α α γ δ γ α α δ αδ
− + + + − + + − + − + − +
= = −
− + + − − + + + − + + + −
. 
          (17) 
 Consumer surplus is 
* 2 * * * 2
1 1 2 2( ) 2 ( )
2
q q q qCS γ+ +=  and due to the symmetric 
equilibrium values (using 1 2q q= ), it reduces to * 21( ) (1 )CS q γ= + . Given the 
equilibrium values, we get that 
        
2 2 2
2 2 2
[2 ( (1 ) (1 )( 1 ) )]
(1 )[4 ( 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 2 ))]CS
γ α γ α αγ δ
γ γ αδ α α γ δ γ α α δ αδ
+ − + + + − +
=
+ + − − + + + − + + + −
.  (18) 
 To show the effects of export cartel on the consumers (and the welfare of the 
importing country), assume that 0δ = , i.e., there is no cooperation among the 
countries 1 and 2, but the degree of cooperation among firms 1 and 2 is α . 
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We get that 
* * *
1 2 2 2
( 1 ) [ ( 2 ( 1 (1 ) ))]( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 1 )[4 ( 2 (1 2 ) (1 ) )]s s s
γ γ γ α γ α α γδ δ δ
αγ γ α α γ α α γ
− + + − + − + +
= = = = = = −
− + + − − + + + +
 
and 
2 2 2
2 2
[ 2 (1 ) ]( 0) (1 )[ 4 (2 (1 2 (1 ) ))]CS
α γδ
γ γ γ α α α α γ
− + +
= =
+ − + + + + − +
. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that there is cooperation among the firms only. 
(a) There exists α , say * [0,1]α ∈ , such that the equilibrium export policy is to tax 
(subsidise) the exporters for *[0, ]α α∈  ( *[ ,1]α α∈ ). 
(b) Consumers in the importing country are better off with higher cooperation among 
the exporters, i.e., with higher α . 
Proof: (a) We get that *( 0) ( )0s δ = < > , i.e., it is export tax (subsidy), at 0α =  
( 1α = ). We also find that 
*( 0) 0s δ
α
∂ =
>
∂
 for [0,1]α ∈ , suggesting that there exists 
* [0,1]α α= ∈  such that *( 0) ( )0s δ = < >  for *[0, ]α α∈  ( *[ ,1]α α∈ ). 
(b) We get that ( 0) 0CS δ
α
∂ =
>
∂
 for [0,1]α ∈ .      ■ 
 
In contrast to the existing result (Eaton and Grossman, 1986), Proposition 2(a) 
shows that export subsidy can be the equilibrium trade policy under price 
competition. The reason for the above result is as follows. It is well-known from the 
previous work (Eaton and Grossman, 1986) that, under price competition, a less 
aggressive pricing strategy of a firm induces its competitors to adopt a less aggressive 
pricing strategy, since prices behave like “strategic complements”. This competition 
reducing motive induces the exporting countries to impose export taxes if the firms do 
not cooperate in the product-market. However, if the firms start cooperating in the 
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product market, the incentive for reducing competition weakens. As a result, if the 
degree of product-market cooperation among the firms increases, it reduces the 
government’s incentive for charging export taxes. If the degree of cooperation among 
the firms is significant, the governments prefer to subsidise the firms. 
We get that 
*( 0) 0s δ
α
∂ =
>
∂
, i.e., subsidy increases with higher cooperation 
among the firms. This benefit from cooperation dominates the negative effect of 
cooperation, viz., higher product-market concentration, and the consumers in the 
importing country are better off under higher cooperation among the exporters. 
Let us now see the implications of cooperation among the governments of the 
exporting countries only, i.e., 0α =  and [0,1]δ ∈ . 
We get that * * *1 2 2
(1 ) (2 )( 0) ( 0) ( 0) 0[4 2 (1 ) ]s s s
γ γ δ γ
α α α
γ δ γ
− +
= = = = = = − <
− − +
, 
suggesting that the exporting countries impose export taxes. We also get that 
2
2
[2 ( )]( 0) (1 )[4 (2 )]CS
γ γ δ
α
γ γ γ γδ
− +
= =
+ − + +
. We further find that 
*( 0) 0s αδ
∂ =
<
∂
 and 
( 0) 0CS αδ
∂ =
<
∂
, suggesting that higher cooperation among the governments of the 
exporting countries increases taxes and also makes the consumers in the importing 
country worse off. 
 We summarise the above discussion in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3: If the exporters do not cooperate but the governments of the exporting 
countries cooperate, higher degree of cooperation among the exporting countries 
increases export tax and makes the consumers in the importing country worse off. 
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As the degree of cooperation among the exporting countries increases, the 
incentive for “business stealing” reduces and the incentive for restricting outputs 
towards the collusive level increases. This motivation induces the countries to 
increase the export tax as the degree of cooperation among the countries increases. 
However, higher tax rates following higher cooperation among the government of the 
exporting countries restrict the total outputs of the firms and make the consumers in 
the importing country worse off. 
 Since consumer surplus depends on the total output for a given degree of 
product differentiation, following the analysis in the Appendix for quantity 
competition, it can be shown that our results under price competition hold for a 
general demand function. We skip this analysis to avoid repetition. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Cooperation among the final goods producers are generally believed to hurt 
consumers at the expenses of higher profits of the firms. We show that this conclusion 
may not hold true in a world with strategic trade policies. In a strategic trade model of 
Brander and Spencer (1985a), we show that, contrary to the traditional harmful effect, 
product-market cooperation among the firms increases consumer surplus through its 
favourable effect on the trade policies. Hence, cooperation among the exporters is not 
necessarily bad for the importing countries in the presence of strategic trade policies. 
Thus, our analysis raises some pertinent questions regarding the harmful effect of 
international export cartel. 
We also show that the consumers in the importing country are affected 
adversely if the cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, 
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instead of the exporting firms. Our results hold under different types of product-
market competition, viz., quantity and price competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
We show here that the results shown in Proposition 1 can hold under a general 
demand function. Assume that the demand function is given by ( )P q  with 0P′ <  and 
0P′′ ≤ , where 1 2q q q= + . We will assume here that the firms compete in quantities. 
Since consumer surplus depends on the total output for a given degree of product 
differentiation, similar procedure can be followed to show that our results under price 
competition hold for a general demand function. However, we skip the analysis under 
price competition to avoid repetition. 
 
A: Cooperation among the firms only under quantity competition: Consider the 
case where cooperation is among the firms only. Firm i maximises 
( ) ( )i i j i i j jG P s q P s qpi αpi α≡ + = + + + , to determine its output, where i, j = 1, 2, 
i j≠ , [0,1]α ∈  and ipi  is the profit of firm i. The equilibrium outputs are given by 
0
i
i
iq i i j
i
G G P s q P q P
q
α
∂
′ ′≡ = + + + =
∂
, i, j = 1, 2, i j≠ .           (A1) 
We have 0
i iiq q
G < , 0
j jjq qG < , 0i jiq qG < , 0j ijq qG < , i i i jiq q iq qG G< , j j j ijq q jq qG G<  and 
i i j j i j j iiq q jq q iq q jq qG G G G>  for 1α <  . 
 The total output is given by 
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1 21 2 1 2
2 (1 ) 0q qG G P s s qPα ′+ = + + + + = .             (A2) 
Differentiating (A2) with respect to α , we get that 
1 2
2 (1 )( )
ds ds qP
dq d d
d P P qP
α α
α α
 
′
− + − 
 
=
′ ′ ′′+ + +
. If 
1 2 0ds ds
d dα α
= = , i.e., cooperation among the firms does not affect government policies, 
we get that 0
2 (1 )( )
dq qP
d P P qPα α
′−
= <
′ ′ ′′+ + +
, which is in line with the usual belief that 
higher cooperation among the firms reduces total output and therefore, consumer 
surplus, since consumer surplus is positively related to total output. Hence, higher 
cooperation among the firms can increase total output only if 1 2 0ds ds
d dα α
 
+ > 
 
. 
 We will now see that 1 0ds
dα
>  and 2 0ds
dα
> . Welfare of country i is 
( , , )i i j i i iW s s s qα pi= − , i, j = 1, 2, i j≠  . The equilibrium subsidies are given by 
 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) (q ) 0
i i i i i
i i j
is i j i is i is js i is
i
W s s
W s s P s q q P q s q
s
α
α
∂
′≡ = + + + − =
∂
        (A3) 
or 0
i i ij is i js i isq P q q P q s qα ′ ′− + − =  , (due to (A1)),            (A3’) 
with i, j = 1, 2, i j≠ , 0
i iis s
W < , 0
j jjs sW < , 0i jis sW < , 0j ijs sW < , i i i jis s is sW W< , 
j j j ijs s js sW W<  and i i j j i j j iis s js s is s js sW W W W>  
 Differentiating (A3) with respect to α , we get the following two equations 
 
1 1 1 2 1
1 2
1 1 1s s s s s
ds dsW W W
d d αα α
+ = −                         (A4)   
 
2 1 2 2 2
1 2
2 2 2s s s s s
ds dsW W W
d d αα α
+ = − .              (A5) 
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Solving (A4) and (A5), we get that 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 21
1 2 1 2
0s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s
W W W Ws
W W W W
α α
α
− +∂
= >
∂ −
, since 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 2 1 2s s s s s s s s
W W W W> , 
1 1 2 21 1 1 2 2 2
0s s s sW q P q q P q Wα α′ ′= − = − = >  (from (A3’), due to 
symmetry and 0
iis
q >  from (A1)), 
2 2 1 12 1s s s s
W W=  (due to symmetry) and 
1 2 1 11 1s s s s
W W> . 
Similarly, we can get that 2 0s
α
∂
>
∂
. Hence, in the presence of strategic trade policies, 
higher cooperation among the firms increases export subsidies and may increase the 
total output, thus benefitting the consumers. 
 Thus, we show that if there is cooperation among the exporters only and the 
product-market is characterised by quantity competition, higher cooperation among 
the firms may benefit the consumers in the importing country if the positive effects of 
cooperation on subsidies are greater than the negative of cooperation on total output. 
Our analysis in the text with the linear demand function satisfies this condition. 
 
B: Cooperation among the countries only under quantity competition: Now we 
consider the case where cooperation is among the countries only. 
     Firm i maximises ( )i i iP s qpi = + , to determine its output, where i, j = 1, 2 and 
i j≠ . The equilibrium outputs are given by 
0
i
i
iq i i
i
P s q P
q
pi
pi
∂
′≡ = + + =
∂
, i, j = 1, 2, i j≠ .                     (B1) 
We have 0
i iiq q
pi < , 0
j jjq qpi < , 0i jiq qpi < , 0j ijq qpi < , i i i jiq q iq qpi pi< , j j j ijq q jq qpi pi<  and 
i i j j i j j iiq q jq q iq q jq qpi pi pi pi> . 
 The total output is given by 
1 21 2 1 2
2 0q q P s s qPpi pi ′+ = + + + = .                        (B2) 
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Differentiating (B2) with respect to δ  (which shows the degree of cooperation among 
the countries), we get that 
1 2
( )0
3
ds ds
dq d d
d P qP
δ δ
δ
 
− + 
 
= < >
′ ′′+
 as 1 2 ( )0ds ds
d dδ δ
 
+ < > 
 
. 
 Country i determines is  to maximise 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) ( )i i j i i j j i j i i i j j jH s s W s s W s s s q s qδ δ δ δ pi δ pi≡ + = − + − , where i, j = 1, 2, 
i j≠  and ( , , ) ( )i i j i i iW s s s qδ pi= −  is welfare of country i. The equilibrium subsidies 
are given by 
( , , )
( ) (q ) [( ) (q ) s q ] 0
i
i i i i i i i i
i i j
is
i
i is i is js i is j js j is js j js
H s s
H
s
P s q q P q s q P s q q P q
δ
δ
∂
≡
∂
′ ′= + + + − + + + + − =
  (B3) 
or ( ) 0
i i i ii js i is j is j jsq P q s q q P q s qδ′ ′− + − =  , (due to (B1)),           (B3’) 
with i, j = 1, 2, i j≠ , 0
i iis s
H < , 0
j jjs sH < , 0i jis sH < , 0j ijs sH < , i i i jis s is sH H< , 
j j j ijs s js sH H<  and i i j j i j j iis s js s is s js sH H H H>  
 Differentiating (B3) with respect to δ , we get the following two equations 
 
1 1 1 2 1
1 2
1 1 1s s s s s
ds dsH H H
d d δδ δ+ = −                           (B4)   
 
2 1 2 2 2
1 2
2 2 2s s s s s
ds dsH H H
d d δδ δ+ = − .               (B5) 
Solving (B4) and (B5), we get that 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 21
1 2 1 2
0s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s
H H H Hs
H H H H
δ δ
δ
− +∂
= <
∂ −
, since 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 2 1 2s s s s s s s s
H H H H> , 
1 1 1 2 2 21 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) 0s s s s s sH q P q s q q P q s q Hδ δ′ ′= − = − = <  (from 
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(B3’), due to symmetry, 0
iis
q >  and 0
ijsq <   from (B1) and j j j ijq q jq qpi pi< ),7 
2 2 1 12 1s s s s
H H=  (due to symmetry) and 
1 2 1 11 1s s s s
H H> . Similarly, we can get that 
2 0sδ
∂
<
∂
. Hence, in the presence of strategic trade policies, higher cooperation among 
the governments of the exporting countries decreases export subsidies and decreases 
the total output, thus hurting the consumers. 
 Thus, we show that if only the exporting countries cooperate and the product-
market is characterised by quantity competition, higher cooperation among the 
exporting countries is harmful for the consumers in the importing country. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 We can get from (B1) that ( ) [ ( )] 0
i i i i ij is j js is j is jsq P q s q Pq s q q′ − = − − + < , since 
0j j j i
i i
i i j j i j j i i i j j i j j i
jq q jq q
is js
iq q jq q iq q jq q iq q jq q iq q jq q
q q
pi pi
pi pi pi pi pi pi pi pi
−
= > > =
− −
 (obtained by taking total 
differentiation of (B1)) and ( ) 0
i iis jsq q+ >  because of j j j ijq q jq qpi pi< .  
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